Strategy and Reality in Afghanistan

It is time to admit what is self-evident: the strategic foundation of NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan is so fundamentally flawed that it cannot be won. America’s longest war, which endures as a deeply troubled nation-building venture, continues to apply a fatally flawed theory of military victory to a maelstrom of Afghan political, social, and economic problems that Western intervention cannot solve. While war advocates speak of endless “fragile progress,” the truth is that the costly effort is not worth the thousands of lives lost or trillions of dollars spent in pursuit of a failed strategy.

The once laudable effort to create a democratic, sustainable and secure Afghanistan has consequently lost intellectual and moral credibility. The NATO command seems bankrupt of any idea that does not cost more American lives and conflate tactical strikes with strategic progress. Always more troops, more bombs, and more taxpayer-funded giveaways. The leadership’s optimism rings increasingly hollow as they promise that another coalition commitment, a few thousand more advisors, an expensive contract for sophisticated equipment, or tired anti-corruption measures will make the difference.

This leads to the conclusion that it is past time for a dramatic shift in strategy that acknowledges the diminishing value of continued investment in Afghanistan. Instead of seeking to control military and political outcomes in fractious and endless social war, the United States and NATO should rapidly adapt to a far more narrow and achievable focus on containing transcontinental terrorism in South Asia. This kind of limited strategy, while not without risk, would prioritize covert and diplomatic means to manage and isolate Afghan turmoil. The resulting freedom of action would ultimately increase American leverage—regionally and globally—by creating new opportunities and divesting liabilities.

Doubling-Down on Failure

The problem in the Afghanistan campaign, as always in such murky interventions, is that it comes back to the Afghans. The NATO mission focuses mostly on military concerns while pretending that training Afghan soldiers and modern technology will somehow achieve broader political and cultural transformation. Western advisors and U.S. firepower cannot create the national unity to combat an externally-enabled insurgency. No amount of NGO support can manufacture a democracy based on liberal values and legitimate governance. And foreign instructors cannot eliminate cultures of corruption that cripple any chance for a modern economy.