No ‘Grand Bargain’ with Putin

The national-security adviser was ecstatic. The presidents of the United States and of Russia had agreed to a ceasefire in Syria, where years of civil war had killed some half a million people and created refugees of millions more. “The United States remains committed to defeating ISIS, helping to end the conflict in Syria, reducing suffering, and enabling people to return to their homes,” the national-security adviser said. “This agreement is an important step toward these common goals.” Southwest Syria would become a zone of “de-confliction.” Among the provinces covered by the agreement: Daraa.

The national-security adviser was H.R. McMaster, the presidents were Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, the time was July 2017, and the ceasefire lasted about eleven months. On June 18, 2018, Syrian government forces launched an offensive against the rebels in Daraa. And the government has since made rapid gains. The Syrian army and its Russian and Iranian allies are pushing up against the borders of both Israel and Jordan. The deal Trump and Putin made in Germany last year has gone the way of all such ceasefires in the Syrian conflict: It is extinct.

And not just in Syria. The “Minsk II” agreement reached in February 2015 called for among other things the cessation of war in eastern Ukraine, removal of heavy weaponry, withdrawal of foreign (read: Russian) troops and mercenaries from the east, and Ukrainian-government control within established national borders. Of course the war continues. “Last week was in some way the worst we have seen so far this year,” an official with the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe said recently. “In total, we recorded 7,700 ceasefire violations.” That was in May. Meanwhile, Russia continues to violate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 with its deployment of the prohibited SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile.

The Russians look at ceasefires and arms control the way you and I look at dieting and nutrition: as pledges that work to one’s advantage in the short term but are ineluctably broken. There is no reason to expect Russia has either the intent or even the capability to act on its promises of diplomatic comity. It’s almost as if Russia can’t help being the bully, especially in regions it considers important such as its near abroad and its beachhead in the Middle East, and especially when it senses an opportunity and feels emboldened. Which is how it feels right now.

No mystery why. Heading into next week’s summit in Helsinki, President Trump has made plain his displeasure with NATO, his willingness to take the same personal tack with Putin (“Putin’s fine. He’s fine”) that he did with Kim Jong-un, his open-mindedness about the future of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014 (“What will happen with Crimea from this point on? That I can’t tell you”), and his desire ultimately to remove U.S. troops from eastern Syria.